The recent summit between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping in Beijing has triggered a wave of strategic anxiety across the First Island Chain. In the Philippines, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has voiced concerns that any conflict over Taiwan would inevitably involve the Philippines due to its geographic proximity to Taiwan and the presence of more than 200,000 Filipinos working there. In Japan, while the government has remained characteristically reserved, the Japanese press has been far more vocal. Headlines such as "The Silence on Taiwan Speaks Volumes" reflect a growing fear that Washington's security guarantees may no longer be as reliable as before.

In this context, Professor Andrew J. Nathan's exercise attempting to read Xi Jinping's mind is both timely and sobering. Nathan seeks to draw policymakers' attention to the danger that President Trump's apparent lack of appreciation for the seriousness of the Taiwan issue could make America's commitment to deterring Xi Jinping's military aggression appear less credible. Such a shift would not only erode the trust of key regional allies, but also risk encouraging dangerous miscalculations in Beijing regarding Washington's actual strategic interests.

Broadly speaking, I agree with most of Professor Nathan's observations. After Trump left Beijing, Xi must have felt deeply satisfied that events unfolded almost exactly as the Chinese leadership had planned: Trump's visit, coming between those of the Iranian foreign minister and Vladimir Putin, made China appear to be the true center of global power. Xi humiliated the United States by invoking the "Thucydides Trap" directly in Trump's presence. For the first time, a U.S. president appeared to accept the G2 framework that previous administrations had rejected for years. Most importantly, China successfully pushed the U.S. president's position on Taiwan from strategic clarity back toward strategic ambiguity. It even appeared that Trump no longer dared to articulate this position openly in front of Xi Jinping.

But how did this happen? Have not the Iran War and the Venezuela Decapitation Strike demonstrated the overwhelming superiority of U.S. military power and technological capability over any other country in the world? Why, then, does the world suddenly seem to be shifting in China's favor? I would argue that the answer lies in the fact that President Trump no longer cares about liberal values and has effectively abandoned one of the three pillars—military, technological, and ideological—of strategic competition constructed by President Biden. As a result, the logic of superpower competition has increasingly tilted in favor of authoritarian regimes.

The Dictator's Advantage: The Erosion of Liberal Values

Over the past decade, U.S.-China competition has unfolded across three dimensions: military, technological, and ideological. The Biden administration developed a competitive strategy that relied upon America’s advantages as a democracy—its alliances with like-minded partners and its legitimacy in defending the liberal international order—to outcompete China. This approach effectively institutionalized competition by isolating sensitive sectors while maintaining cooperation in non-essential areas to avoid escalation.

However, during President Trump's second term, the return of a more isolationist and transactional foreign policy has fundamentally altered this dynamic. By viewing international relationships through a purely mercantilist lens, the United States risks dismantling the rules-based order it helped build after the Second World War. In its place, a system of "weaponized interdependence" has gradually emerged, where power is measured by control over critical choke points in global supply chains and geostrategic networks.

This is a game for which Beijing has been preparing for more than two decades. Unlike a democracy, which must remain responsive to a public sensitive to economic disruption, an autocracy can absorb substantial domestic pain in pursuit of strategic objectives. We witnessed this during previous tariff escalations: although the United States possessed greater economic leverage, the administration's sensitivity to market fluctuations and approval ratings often produced hesitation. Xi Jinping, by contrast, has repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to tolerate severe internal economic contraction in order to preserve China's geopolitical positioning.

The ideological dimension—once America's "Ace of Spades"—now risks being discarded altogether. Without the moral authority that comes from leading a democratic alliance, U.S. hegemony rests increasingly upon hard power and the personal whims of political leaders. In a "game of chicken" against a dictator who controls the domestic narrative and suppresses dissent, a democracy that must constantly respond to public opinion is structurally disadvantaged.

The Beijing Summit: A Masterclass in Narrative Control

The timing of the Beijing summit was highly significant. Delayed from late March to mid-May because of the ongoing Iran War, the meeting was portrayed by the Chinese Communist Party as a historic turning point. Owing to the Supreme Court ruling and the prolonged Iran conflict, President Trump arrived in Beijing with a weaker bargaining position than he had held the previous year in Busan. China sought to seize this rare opportunity to advance three major strategic objectives:

First, Beijing sought to frame the Taiwan issue as the core problem in current U.S.-China relations. If managed effectively, relations could stabilize; if mishandled, the two countries could face collision or even conflict, pushing the entire relationship into a dangerous state. As Xi Jinping himself stated during the summit, "'Taiwan independence' and peace across the Taiwan Strait are irreconcilable. Maintaining peace across the Taiwan Strait is the greatest common ground in U.S.-China relations." This amounted to an attempt to steer both sides toward a framework of "U.S.-China co-management of Taiwan."

Second, Xi raised the concept of the "Thucydides Trap" for the first time at a leaders' summit. Xi told Trump that the world was now experiencing "...a century of change...at a crossroads. Whether China and the U.S. can overcome the 'Thucydides Trap' and forge a new model for great-power relations is a historical question that must be addressed collaboratively." This framing implied a broader narrative of "the rise of the East and the decline of the West," suggesting that the United States should accommodate this historical trend and relinquish strategic control of the Western Pacific to China in order to avoid conflict.

Third, Xi proposed a "constructive strategic stability relationship between China and the United States," one that would be "primarily cooperative, with measured competition, controllable differences, and achievable peace." According to Beijing, such a framework would "provide strategic guidance for U.S.-China relations for the next three years and beyond." This proposal not only offered concrete mechanisms for stabilizing relations if the Taiwan issue were "handled properly"—thus satisfying Washington's desire for détente—but also sought to solidify the G2 framework that China has advocated for years, thereby elevating U.S.-China relations to a position of equal standing on the international stage.

Back in the United States, Trump appeared to believe that his personal relationship with Xi Jinping had secured temporary détente and stability in bilateral relations, along with China's commitment to purchase the "3Bs" — Boeings, beef, and beans. Yet judging from the overwhelmingly critical editorials in mainstream media, statements from members of Congress across both parties, and subsequent clarifications issued by officials within the Trump administration, it became clear that the results of the Beijing Summit were not well received domestically. Confronted by the Iran War and looming midterm elections upon returning home, Trump will likely shift his attention to another objective where he can once again portray himself as a winner.

The Taiwan Issue: The Risk of Apparent Accommodation to Beijing

The greatest danger emerging from the summit is the perception that America's commitments to Taiwan's security are now negotiable. In the realm of deterrence, what allies believe you will do is just as important as what you actually do. Reports that the administration might delay a $14 billion arms sale package to Taiwan as a "goodwill gesture" have generated serious concern. Such a move would be widely viewed as a departure from the "Six Assurances" established in 1982, which stipulated that the United States would neither consult Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan nor set a date for ending them.

Four days after Trump departed, Xi Jinping welcomed Vladimir Putin for his 26th state visit to Beijing. The two leaders issued a joint statement advocating a multipolar world and a new type of international relations. If partners such as Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines begin to doubt the credibility of the U.S. security commitment in the region, they may gradually feel compelled to move toward forms of neutrality that favor China. Such a development would effectively mark the end of the era of American leadership in the Pacific. The multipolar world envisioned by Xi and Putin would then become reality.

Conclusion: The Need for Consistent Leadership

In conclusion, while a transactional approach to diplomacy may produce immediate results—such as large-scale purchase agreements and temporary pauses in trade wars—it also carries significant long-term risks for America's credibility. The enduring strength of the United States has traditionally rested upon its ability to lead coalitions of like-minded countries in maintaining the liberal international order.

To preserve its position in the Pacific, Washington must ensure that its pursuit of "the deal" does not come at the expense of the trust it has cultivated with allies over the past eighty years. President Trump should formally submit the planned $14 billion arms package to Congress as soon as possible in order to restore U.S. credibility. True leadership in the Indo-Pacific requires balance: securing fair economic outcomes for Americans while maintaining a firm and unwavering commitment to the security of the First Island Chain. Without such balance, the United States risks losing not merely a trade competition, but the hegemonic position it has held since the end of the Second World War.