The Return of Indivisible Security

Following the outbreak of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, leaders in liberal democratic nations increasingly spoke of the indivisibility of Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security. The conflict, they argued, demonstrated that no country could isolate itself from economic shocks in faraway lands. Nor, it was contended, should support for the principle of self-determination nor opposition to wars of conquest stop at the border of one continent. The pushing of this notion of indivisibility, however, was also a clarion call for like-minded European and Asian nations to work together in response to authoritarians and their revisionist ambitions.

Taiwan is, of course, central to the idea that the two regions' security is linked. After all, where might Fumio Kishida have been thinking of when he said, "Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow?" Leading figures in Japan have since made this connection more explicit. Sanae Takaichi, for example, has argued that a Taiwan contingency would directly affect Japan's own security, underscoring that instability in the Taiwan Strait would pose a serious challenge not only to Japan's defense but also to the wider regional order.

In recent years, publics and policymakers around the world have grown more attuned to Taiwan's importance to both the balance of power in the Pacific and the global economy, due in large part to its leading role in the production of advanced semiconductors. At the same time, there is a heightened awareness of the growing threat that Beijing's expansionist ambitions pose to cross-strait stability.

Britain's Strategic Shift Toward the Taiwan Strait

Britain has been part of this journey. From the 2021 Integrated Review to its 'refreshed' version, two years later, London went from talking opaquely about 'potential flashpoints' in the Indo-Pacific to committing itself to 'support stability' across the Taiwan Strait. The current Labour government, although more mute on such matters, nevertheless, spoke of the 'centrality' of the Taiwan Strait to global trade and supply chains in its National Security Strategy. Last year's document also warned of 'a particular risk of escalation around Taiwan' and promised: 'with Taiwan we will continue to strengthen and grow ties in a wide range of areas, underpinned by shared democratic values.'

From Presence to Partnership: Defense and Deterrence in Practice

Words have been backed by action. During both Carrier Strike Group deployments to the region in 2021 and 2025, a Royal Navy vessel peeled away to transit the Taiwan Strait. Meanwhile, the AUKUS partnership is set, over the medium term, to strengthen deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. Earlier this year, HMS Anson, an Astute-class submarine, visited Perth as part of the trilateral arrangement that will establish a rotational presence of one British submarine and up to four U.S. vessels at HMAS Stirling. These nuclear-powered submarines, and the future SSN-AUKUS boats, will have the range and endurance to operate and patrol across the First Island Chain.

Britain's support has also had more immediate implications for Taiwan's defense capabilities. In recent years, London has approved export licenses for submarine components and related technologies, supporting Taipei's indigenous submarine program. With this assistance, the Taiwanese Navy completed the maiden sea trial of its first domestically developed submarine, the Narwhal, earlier this year.

Expanding the Security Domain: Cyber, Space, and Infrastructure Resilience

More recently, British efforts to support Taiwan have extended beyond conventional military domains into cyber and space. Given the scale of cyberattacks directed at Taiwan—2.6 million per day, according to its National Security Bureau—it is little surprise that cooperation has intensified in this area. Such threats are, moreover, an increasingly salient challenge for the United Kingdom itself.

To date, the British Office in Taipei, the United Kingdom's de facto embassy, has organized two cyber missions to Taiwan. These delegations have facilitated exchanges between U.K. cybersecurity firms and Taiwanese counterparts across industry, government, and academia, with the aim of strengthening Taiwan's cyber resilience while enabling British companies to draw on Taiwan's considerable expertise. The second mission, which included firms specializing in artificial intelligence and post-quantum cryptography, reflects a shared effort to address emerging and increasingly sophisticated threats.

The Taiwanese government's growing interest in space is driven in part by security concerns—above all, the need to enhance surveillance capabilities and ensure resilient communications in the event of a cross-strait contingency. As this interest has expanded, so too has cooperation with the United Kingdom. At last September's UK–Taiwan Space Roundtable, officials pointed to the efficiencies gained through bilateral collaboration in building, launching, and operating advanced space technologies.

During these discussions, Taiwan's space agency signed a five-year memorandum of understanding with Satellite Applications Catapult, a U.K. government-backed innovation organization, aimed at further pooling resources to expand both sides' space economies and advance future operations. The partnership is inherently complementary, combining the United Kingdom's satellite ecosystem with Taiwan's strengths in semiconductor production, as the British Office in Taipei has emphasized.

These efforts come alongside the recent announcement that Chunghwa Telecom, Taiwan's largest telecommunications provider, has secured the country's first commercial license to operate low-Earth orbit satellite services using technology from Eutelsat OneWeb, a U.K.-backed company. This follows the installation of terminal equipment at more than 700 sites across Taiwan to ensure nationwide coverage. Together, these developments mark significant steps in a partnership that, since late 2023, has also included plans to establish a satellite service terminal testing center in Taiwan. In the event of a conflict, such systems could provide a critical backup for government, military, and emergency communications should the undersea cables on which Taiwan depends be cut.

On the issue of the cutting of undersea cables, there is clear scope for deeper cross-regional cooperation. Having both experienced such incidents, Taiwan and European countries share an interest in improving monitoring, ensuring perpetrators are held accountable, and strengthening repair capabilities. Communication infrastructure resilience was, accordingly, the focus of a recent Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF) workshop, in which the United Kingdom participated, centered on the protection and repair of submarine cables.

Meanwhile, in early April, the British Office in Taipei co-hosted, for the first time since becoming a full partner of the initiative, a Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF) workshop on cybersecurity. Over three days, experts from government, the private sector, and civil society explored ways to deepen collaboration and leverage emerging technologies to address evolving cyber threats.

Mutual learning has also taken place across other channels. Cyberattacks and defending democratic systems were central to discussions in 2022, when Britain's security minister, Tom Tugendhart met with Taiwanese digital minister, Audrey Tang. Only last month, Tugendhart reminded his fellow parliamentarians again that: 'Taiwan has a lot to teach us about the way in which China tries to influence our democracy'. 

In a similar vein, Britain's representative to Taiwan, Ruth Bradley Jones has highlighted Taiwan's experience of promoting whole-of-society resilience as another area which the United Kingdom could learn— much as Taiwan has drawn emulated the experience of Nordic and Baltic nations that have extensive experience confronting hybrid threats from their larger neighbour.

The United Kingdom's relationship with Taiwan is, moreover, only one example of how countries across the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific are reinforcing one another's security. Polish and Czech interest in Taiwanese "non-red" drones—that is, unmanned aerial vehicles without Chinese components—has surged. The appeal, however, is broader. As one Taiwanese manufacturer observed of shifting European attitudes, "there is much less caution now. The world has changed because of Ukraine."

Toward a Cross-Regional Security Network

Conversations and collaboration look set to continue—and may well expand into areas where the United Kingdom can bring world-class expertise and resources, such as maritime security. Cooperation in these nontraditional fronts, driven in part by the private sector and civil society, is also better positioned to withstand shifting global political pressures, including the renewed focus on the Middle East, which is placing additional strain on already stretched and under-resourced British forces. Over time, such partnerships may help normalize Taiwan's bilateral engagement with European countries, laying the groundwork for deeper and more sustained collaboration.