- Xi Jinping has observed new developments in hybrid and proxy warfare from Russia's invasion of Ukraine, including unmanned combat, cognitive offense-defense operations, and intelligence crowdsourcing.
- The U.S. approach of assisting Ukraine without deploying troops is viewed by Beijing as a likely model for future American involvement in a Taiwan Strait conflict, prompting early preparation.
- Following the India-Pakistan air battle, the PLA may seek to seize air superiority over Taiwan without crossing the median line of the Strait, instead conducting “three non-war operations” within its own airspace.
Since the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese war, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has lacked real combat experience. Its indirect participation in the Russia–Ukraine conflict has thus provided rare opportunities to test operational doctrines and upgrade capabilities for future military struggles across the Taiwan Strait or against the United States.
According to the 2023 "Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Military Study Guide" compiled by the Central Military Commission's Political Work Department, Xi summarized the Ukraine war as follows:
"This Ukraine crisis shows new developments in hybrid and proxy warfare -unmanned operations, cognitive offense and defense, crowdsourced intelligence, and distributed force deployment are emerging one after another. The overall contest of comprehensive national power and hybrid confrontation has become more prominent. We must strengthen civil–military coordination, plan for people's war in the new era, and enhance national-level strategic pre-planning."
For Xi, Vladimir Putin's hybrid war against Ukraine carries major practical meaning.
Russia's Hybrid War: The Contradictions and Lessons
"Hybrid warfare" was coined by U.S. strategist Frank Hoffman in Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars (2007). Russia's version evolved through its involvement in Ukraine (since 2014) and Syria (2015–2016). In 2015, Chief of the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov elaborated the concept—modern conflicts no longer rely purely on military confrontation but integrate political, economic, informational, and other non-military tools to achieve strategic goals through minimal force.
From 2014 onward, Russia's hybrid operations around Ukraine, using disinformation, lawfare, and long-term military posturing, kept the U.S., NATO, and the EU guessing. These flexible and ambiguous tactics were initially successful. Yet once Putin launched his full-scale invasion in February 2022, Russia's strategy and command faltered. Poor logistics, communication failures, and low morale turned the campaign into a regression toward World-War-era tactics. The so-called "special military operation" devolved into a chaotic hybrid war - its pre-war ambiguity shattered by conventional attrition.
Xi's interpretation of these failures has shaped China's approach to Taiwan: avoiding the Russian mistake of escalation. Instead, Beijing aims to integrate conventional and non-conventional means—military, economic, diplomatic, and informational—into a consistent, hybrid strategy that deters or disables opponents without full-scale war.
Indirect Involvement: Learning Through Others' Wars
Beijing's indirect participation in the Russia–Ukraine war has yielded lessons in three areas—maintaining the "red supply chain," collecting intelligence on U.S. weapon performance, and sharing battlefield experience with Moscow.
Confirmation of "Integrated Multi-Domain Operations"
On May 7, 2025, an India–Pakistan air battle reshaped air-combat history. According to Pakistani officials, Indian jets were "trapped inside our kill chain." Over 114 aircraft engaged (72 Indian, 42 Pakistani), yet both sides remained within their own airspace. The 52-minute engagement saw Pakistan shoot down six Indian aircraft—including Rafales—using Chinese-made PL-15E missiles fired from J-10C fighters at 160–190 km range, marking the largest beyond-visual-range (BVR) engagement in history.
Pakistan's dispersed mobile electronic-warfare units disrupted India's Meteor missiles, nullifying their advanced avionics. Rafale pilots reportedly had only three seconds to react before being hit. The October 2025 issue of AirForces Monthly gave an exclusive, detailed reconstruction of the engagement. It revealed that Pakistan, after a four-year reform, had integrated space, cyber, electronic, ground-air defense, UAVs, and strike systems into a unified Integrated Multi-Domain Operations (IMDO) framework—transforming its air force into a multi-domain force.
According to the aforementioned report, the system uses domestically produced satellites to provide all-weather intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support. Through the indigenous Air Force Link-17 data link, it transmits real-time information to aircraft such as the J-10C fighters imported from China and the Erieye early-warning aircraft imported from Sweden, providing pilots with the situational awareness needed to win the battle. Each pilot receives a shared tactical picture via an encrypted data link, which is constructed through the integration of the Link-17 network and ground-based air defense systems. The basic operational process involves the Erieye aircraft assigning targets and transmitting precise instructions to J-10C formations through Link-17; the J-10Cs then launch PL-15E air-to-air missiles from long range and immediately disengage for safety, while the Erieye continues to guide the missiles to their targets via the data link.
The report quoted an anonymous senior officer of the Pakistani Air Force as saying that although China has operated J-10 fighters for twenty years, "they have never used it the way we do." In other words, although China is the manufacturer of the J-10C, Pakistan's Air Force has integrated the aircraft more deeply, creatively, and purposefully into multi-domain operations (MDO), achieving specific operational goals more effectively than the PLA Air Force.
In an exclusive interview with Chinese media, Chairman of the Pakistani Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee General Sahir Shamshad Mirza stated that Pakistan's use of multiple systems represents a "systemic synergy." He noted that while both the Rafale and J-10C are advanced fighters, "we have better integrated the J-10C into our tactical system," and the results speak for themselves.
PLA's Takeaway: Toward "Seamless Multi-Domain Integration"
On July 8, 2025, PLA Air Force Chief Wang Gang led a delegation to Pakistan, praising its "precision, discipline, and courage" and its "high readiness and advanced capability." He expressed strong interest in learning from Pakistan's "combat-tested multi-domain operational experience."
The PLA calls this doctrine "integrated multi-domain joint operations (多域一體聯合作戰)," characterized by "system-of-systems confrontation." Xi Jinping has repeatedly emphasized that "informationized warfare is a contest of systems," urging the PLA to build and win through such integrated systems—what he calls "system victory."
From the Pakistan–India air battle, the PLA gained its first live example of the synergy of multi-domain operations. In future Taiwan scenarios, Beijing may attempt to seize air superiority without crossing the Strait's median line, instead conducting "three non-contact" operations—asymmetric, non-contact, and non-linear—launching long-range precision strikes from within China's airspace. Such tactics would provide powerful military means within a broader hybrid-war framework against Taiwan, while posing a serious challenge to U.S. forces approaching the Taiwan Strait.
（Translated by Ketty W. Chen and Nicole Wong）